Thought, Fact, and Reference: The Origins and Ontology of by Herbert Irving Hochberg

By Herbert Irving Hochberg

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Pronounced, in French, approxi­ mately Der. ) , in proximity to "Wo? Da. " in German, to "Her. " in Danish, they begin to function as integral or fragmented entities [corps], or as whole seg­ ments of common nouns or even of things? e. having little chance of coming to pass and in any case impossible to prove. This word, "improbable," which the reader has already encountered above ("improbable debate") was therefore a clandestine citation. Now, this is my question: what happens, what will happen as far as the three + n authors of the Reply are concerned, if I tell them (where?

And even if they can (pure hypothesis), is the signature identical with the writing, that is the mention, of a proper name at the bottom of a text? Where is the boundary, in this case, between mention and use? And is the proper name to be identified with the patronym (including first names or initials) registered in the official records? I abandon here these questions which, let it be mentioned in passing, I have attempted to treat elsewhere, in another fashion. To remain with the "signature" of Signature Event Context, the Reply to Derrida1 seems to take it for granted, as though it were as clear and as certain as a copyright guaranteed by international conven­ tions (up to a certain point, that is, and of relatively recent date).

All the more loudly, nervously, regularly, to denounce and to name them all the more frequently, because at bottom they are not quite as evident as all that: there is always the danger of their being forgotten. It is to remind us of this less-than­ evident evidence that the word obvious, obviously (as in "obviously false," p. 203) is so often invoked, as though to nip any doubt in the bud. But the effect produced is the reverse. For my part, wherever and whenever I hear the words " it's true, " "it's false," "it's evident," "evidently this or that," or "in a fairly obvious way" (p.

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