Guns and Butter: The Economic Causes and Consequences of by Gregory D. Hess
By Gregory D. Hess
Insights into conflict and family lack of confidence, terrorism, and the prices of struggle and peace from new study that takes the political economic system standpoint on clash.
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Extra resources for Guns and Butter: The Economic Causes and Consequences of Conflict (CESifo Seminar Series)
As I discuss in the case studies, there are many examples of nineteenthcentury leaders like Napoleon III and Bismarck who were willing to go to war to stay in power, but that there is little evidence of any The Political Economy of Warfare 35 twentieth-century American or British incumbents going to war for political purposes. The ﬁrst case study looks at nineteenth-century Europe, where both Napoleon III and Bismarck used wars for domestic political purposes (Mansﬁeld and Snyder 2005). Napoleon III’s foreign adventures rallied support for his wobbly regime for understandable reasons.
C. Heath. Thucydides. 1959. History of the Peloponnesian War. 3 vols. Trans. T. Hobbes. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Wagner, R. H. 2000. Bargaining and war. American Journal of Political Science 44 (3): 469– 484. 32 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita Waltz, K. N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. : Addison-Wesley. Werner, S. 1996. Absolute and limited war: The possibility of foreign-imposed regime change. International Interactions 22 (1): 67–88. Wintrobe, R. 1990. The tinpot and the totalitarian: An economic theory of dictatorship.
Nation Building and Democratization Looking beyond the democratic peace to other differences in foreign policy conduct that depend on the internal institutional arrangements of states reveals still other regularities that are overlooked when treating states, rather than leaders, as the central players in international affairs. For instance, we know that the timing of wars by democratic leaders is strongly inﬂuenced by the election cycle and electoral rules (Gaubatz 1999; Fordham 1998; Smith 2004), and we believe that democratic leaders are more constrained than autocrats are to carry out the threats they make because of domestic audience costs (Fearon 1994).